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WHERE SHOULD WE LAND?: FLYOVER 
DISTRICTS AS PROPER VENUE FOR 
CRIMES COMMITTED IN AIR ON 
DOMESTIC FLIGHTS 
MEGAN E. MCCARTHY* 
This Essay explores the recently resolved circuit split between the Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits regarding the proper venue for crimes 
committed on an airplane during flight. In 2019, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the proper venue for trying an assault that happened midflight was the 
district over which the airplane was flying when the assault occurred. While 
flyover districts may seem like a surprising and inconvenient choice for 
venue, flyover districts are the only constitutionally proper venue for point-
in-time offenses that occur on airplanes during flight. Furthermore, using 
current aviation tracking protocols and GPS technology, courts can pinpoint 
the location of a plane easily and accurately at any point during flight. The 
main obstacle to prosecuting criminal cases in flyover districts is not 
technological but human. Flight attendants lack established standards and 
procedures for documenting and reporting incidents as they occur, especially 
incidents of sexual assault. This Essay provides recommendations for 
standardized form recording and reporting procedures to enable courts to 
accurately and constitutionally prosecute crimes that occur during flight. 
While flyover districts may be judicially uneconomical, until Congress steps 
in to provide a statutory basis for prosecuting crimes outside the district in 
which they occurred, flyover districts remain the proper venue for crimes 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, over eight hundred million passengers traveled domestically 
by plane across the United States on about eight million flights.1 Traveling 
 
 1 BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Passengers All 
Carriers – All Airports, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1 [https://pe
rma.cc/GE2R-BU6J]. In 2020, likely due to the onset of the COVD-19 pandemic, air travel 
significantly decreased but still amassed just over three hundred million domestic travelers. 
Id. 
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by air can be stressful, a bit uncomfortable, and sometimes violent. In 
October 2019, an intoxicated man began assaulting passengers on a 
Southwest Airlines plane flying from Texas to California, forcing an early 
landing in Arizona.2 During the summer of 2019, a woman on an American 
Airlines flight from Florida to California assaulted her boyfriend by hitting 
him repeatedly with her laptop when she caught him looking at images of 
another woman.3 In March 2019, a Hawaiian Airlines flight from Hawaii to 
California was forced to turn around after two male passengers began 
brawling after one allegedly bumped into the other.4 
Incidents of sexual assaults during flight are increasing as well.5 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported a 66% increase in reported 
sexual assaults on commercial flights over the past few years.6 The true 
increase in assaults is likely higher as many cases go unreported.7 
Additionally, the FBI only tracks cases reported directly to the agency; 
reports made to the Department of Transportation are sent to the airline, not 
law enforcement.8 In 2017, a survey by the Association of Flight Attendants 
reported that “[o]ne-fifth of flight attendants said they had received a report 
of passenger-on-passenger sexual assault while working on a flight,” and 
“[l]aw enforcement officials were contacted or met the plane less than half 
 
 2 Associated Press, Unruly Passenger Forces L.A.-Bound Flight to Divert to Tucson, 
KTLA 5 (Oct. 9, 2019, 3:11 PM), https://ktla.com/2019/10/09/unruly-passenger-forces-l-a-
bound-flight-to-divert-to-tucson/ [https://perma.cc/J8P5-C6R7]. 
 3 Lee Brown, Plane Passenger Throws Laptop at Boyfriend for ‘Looking at Other 
Women’, N.Y. POST (July 23, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/07/23/plane-
passenger-throws-laptop-at-boyfriend-for-looking-at-other-women/ [https://perma.cc/6BXL-
G8SB]. 
 4 Andrea Romano, Unruly Passengers Force Hawaiian Airlines Flight to Turn Back 2 
Hours Into Trip, TRAVEL + LEISURE (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.travelandleisure.com/
travel-news/fight-causes-hawaiian-airlines-flight-turn-around [https://perma.cc/4HBN-WQF
Y]. 
 5 Javier De Diego, Omar Jimenez, Rene Marsh & Juana Summers, FBI: Sexual Assaults 
On Flights Increasing ‘At An Alarming Rate,’ CNN (June 20, 2018, 9:19 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2018/06/20/politics/fbi-airplane-sexual-assault/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/LU6D-9D9C]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Christopher Mele, Sexual Assault on Flights: Experts Recommend Ways to Stay Safe and 
Combat It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/travel/airline-
flights-sexual-assault.html [https://perma.cc/YP4X-4CL8]. 
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the time.”9 Due to underreporting that is systemic in all sexually-based 
crimes, the true extent of the problem is unknown.10 
In-flight violence is not a new phenomenon; it has been a reality of air 
travel for decades and has come to be known as “air rage.”11 Neither is in-
flight violence simply an American phenomenon; the International Air 
Transport Association reported that there were 8,731 “unruly incidents” 
aboard airplane flights around the world in 2017.12 These incidents ranged 
from verbal outbursts to both life- and flight-threatening behavior.13 In many 
cases, air flight personnel are the victims of “air rage,”14 but this Essay 
focuses only on inter-passenger violence on domestic U.S. flights because 
procedures for crimes committed against air flight personnel are more 
thoroughly and clearly governed.15 
When law enforcement does respond to in-flight crime and an 
investigation results in charges, prosecuting the case presents a unique venue 
issue. Since the 1980s, circuit courts have characterized crimes that occur on 
a form of transportation as continuing crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 3237, which 
can then be prosecuted in multiple districts simply due to the circumstance 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 See generally Cameron Kimble & Inimai M. Chettiar, Sexual Assault Remains 
Dramatically Underreported, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.bren
nancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/sexual-assault-remains-dramatically-underreported 
[https://perma.cc/TVB7-356N]; The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAINN, 
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/ZTB5-SFEU] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 11 William Mann, All the (Air) Rage: Legal Implications Surrounding Airline and 
Government Bans on Unruly Passengers in the Sky, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 857, 857–59 (2000). 
 12 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, UNRULY AND DISRUPTIVE PASSENGER INCIDENTS AND WHY 
NO ONE LIKES THEM, https://www.iata.org/contentassets/b7efd7f114b44a30b9cf1ade59a0
2f06/unruly_pax_infographic_2017.pdf [perma.cc/HGY2-M8M2]. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Survey Reveals Widespread Harassment of Flight Attendants, ASS’N OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS-CWA (May 10, 2018), https://www.afacwa.org/survey_reveals_widespread_h
arassment_of_flight_attendants [https://perma.cc/B3EU-H736]. 
 15 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (2001) states that 
[a]n individual on an aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States who, by 
assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with 
the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or 
attendant to perform those duties, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under 
title 18, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both. However, if a dangerous weapon is used 
in assaulting or intimidating the member or attendant, the individual shall be imprisoned for any 
term of years or for life. 
Federal Aviation Regulations 91.11, 121.580, and 135.120 state that “no person may assault, 
threaten, intimidate, or interfere with a crewmember in the performance of the crewmember’s 
duties aboard an aircraft being operated.” 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.11, 121.580, 135.120 (1999). 
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element of being on a form of transportation.16 Crimes that occur in a single 
location, such as assault, take on no new elements by occurring on a form of 
transportation. Nonetheless, courts have classified crimes as continuing 
offenses if they occur on planes, when they are otherwise point-in-time 
offenses on the ground. 
Courts have unjustifiably broadened § 3237 to become a catch-all for 
any crime that occurs on a form of transportation.17 When it was enacted, 
§ 3237 was not intended to be a catch-all provision; it served a specific 
purpose.18 Section 3237 is meant to govern crimes that are committed “in one 
district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district” 
and crimes that involve “the use of the mails, transportation in interstate or 
foreign commerce.”19 When prosecuting midflight crimes, courts have used 
§ 3237 to justify venue in whatever district the flight lands.20 By broadening 
§ 3237, courts have created a jurisdictional loophole allowing crimes to be 
charged outside of the district in which they occurred, in direct violation of 
what the Constitution requires.21 
This Essay discusses the legal foundation for restricting venue to the 
district over which an assault on an airplane occurred—the “flyover 
district”—and posits that such restriction is constitutional and practical. Both 
the Constitution and Declaration of Independence require that justice be 
administered in the same district in which the crime occurred.22 With today’s 
global positioning technology and a straightforward reporting procedure, 
determining where a crime occurred midflight is entirely possible.23 
This Essay first discusses the historical background of venue and how 
restrictions measures are at the core of its creation. Part II examines the 
significance of classifying a crime as “continuing” or “point-in-time” in 
relation to § 3237 and asserts that assault is always a point-in-time offense, 
thus falling outside the scope of § 3237. Next, Part III analyzes the recent 
 
 16 See, e.g., United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 17 See Breitweiser, 357 F.3d at 1253–54; McCulley, 673 F.2d at 350. 
 18 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 19 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2012). 
 20 See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 
at 1253–54. 
 21 The Constitution twice mentions restricting venue to the place where the crime occurs. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the 
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). 
 22 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
 23 Infra Part IV. 
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circuit split that attempts to further expand § 3237 to all crimes that occur on 
airplanes. Then, in Part IV, this Essay describes how airlines can assist with 
venue determinations for in-flight crimes by using current aviation 
technology and improving their crime reporting protocols. Lastly, Part V 
addresses counterarguments to restricting venue to flyover districts, such as 
using destination districts or applying the substantial contacts test, 
concluding that no counterargument has the constitutional backing of flyover 
districts. 
I. BACKGROUND ON VENUE 
Despite hundreds of years of social change, technological advancement, 
and government expansion, many principles set forth by the Framers remain 
unchanged. The procedure for deciding proper venue for criminal trials grew 
out of colonial resistance to British courts.24 Today, venue provisions are 
standard in all American courts, and, at the federal level, the rules for 
determining venue are codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.25 
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF VENUE 
“Venue” is the geographic area “where a criminal action is brought to 
trial.”26 The principle requiring courts to limit venue to the location where 
the criminal act occurred is most clearly established in the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee that a defendant be tried “by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”27 Like many 
principles of our nation’s legal framework, the idea to limit venue was 
created in response to injustices inflicted by the British Empire.28 In 1769, 
the British Parliament attempted to remove colonists from America to 
England for trial.29 The Framers abhorred this practice and noted their disdain 
in the Declaration of Independence by condemning King George III “[f]or 
transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pre-tended Offences.”30 
The Framers reiterated their intent to limit venue in criminal cases in the 
text of the original Constitution: “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held 
 
 24 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
 25 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. 
 26 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND RIGHTS OF ACCUSED § 158 (2021). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 28 See Paul Mogin, “Fundamental Since Our Country’s Founding”: United States v. 
Auernheimer and the Sixth Amendment Right to Be Tried in the District in Which the Alleged 
Crime Was Committed, 6 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 37, 40–41 (2016). 
 29 Id. 
 30 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
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in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.”31 This 
provision was not restrictive enough for all of the Framers, some of whom 
were concerned that states were too large of an area to use.32 The Framers 
further restricted venue to districts within each state in the Sixth 
Amendment.33 At the time of ratification, there were thirteen districts; each 
state had a single district, except Massachusetts and Virginia which each had 
two districts.34 Currently, there are ninety-four federal districts, with each 
state having at least one, as well as the territories of Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each having one.35 
Today, the restrictions on venue are codified in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which states that “the government must prosecute an 
offense in a district where the offense was committed.”36 The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that venue determinations are not mere technicalities or 
formalities but questions of great concern.37 The Court has emphasized the 
repeated appearance of venue restrictions in the Constitution as the basis for 
their concern.38 
B. HOW TO ESTABLISH VENUE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 requires that the government 
determine where a crime was committed.39 In order to determine where a 
crime was committed, the government must look to the elements of the 
 
 31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 32 Mogin, supra note 28, at 42. 
 33 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed”). 
 34 Mogin, supra note 27, at 42. 
 35 Court Role and Structure, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure [https://perma.cc/4S82-72GV]. 
 36 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998) (recognizing that “[p]roper 
venue in criminal proceedings was a matter of concern to the Nation’s founders. . . . [t]he 
Constitution twice safeguards the defendant’s venue right”); Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 
631, 634 (1961) (stating that “[w]e therefore begin our inquiry from the premise that questions 
of venue are more than matters of mere procedure”); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 
276 (1944) (stating that “[t]hese are matters that touch closely the fair administration of 
criminal justice and public confidence in it, on which it ultimately rests”); United States v. 
Dawson, 56 U.S. 467, 473 (1854) (stating that unrestricted venue “was a power dangerous and 
odious in the extreme. The sixth article of the amendments wisely took away this whole power, 
and provided that the trial of all criminal prosecutions should be by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime should have been committed”). 
 38 See Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6; Travis, 364 U.S. at 634; Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275; Dawson, 
56 U.S. at 487–88. 
 39 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. 
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crime.40 Venue is proper in the locations where the actions constituting the 
elements of the offense took place.41 In some statutes, Congress explicitly 
states where venue is proper for that crime,42 but Congress did not provide a 
venue statement for assault. 
When analyzing the elements of a crime to establish venue, it is crucial 
“to separate ‘essential conduct elements’ from ‘circumstance element[s].’”43 
Venue is “determined solely by the essential conduct elements.”44 The 
essential conduct elements are the actions an offender must take in order for 
a crime to be committed.45 Circumstance elements are any other external or 
environmental factors.46 Circumstance elements may affect the execution of 
essential conduct elements, may make the essential conduct elements 
possible, or may include actions taken by the offender after the fact.47 For 
example, when an offender is charged with harboring a fugitive, the only 
essential conduct element is the act of harboring.48 While it is also necessary 
for the fugitive to have a warrant issued against them, issuing a warrant 
would not be an essential conduct element for the crime, so the district where 
the warrant was issued would not be a district where an essential conduct 
element of the crime occurred.49 Some crimes, such as harboring a fugitive 
or kidnapping, can happen over long periods of time and in more than one 
place, which further complicates a court’s venue analysis. 
II. IS ASSAULT A CONTINUING OFFENSE? 
All criminal offenses can be classified as either a point-in-time offense 
or a continuing offense.50 The term “continuing offense” is a term of art.51 
Continuing offenses have been described as a “series of acts set on foot by a 
 
 40 David Spears, Venue in Federal Criminal Cases: A Strange Duck, 43 CHAMPION 24, 25 
(2019). 
 41 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 42 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 228(e) (1998) (providing venue for failure to pay child support); 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(h) (2008) (providing venue for obstruction of justice). 
 43 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 533 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 
275, 276 (1999)). 
 44 United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 45 Id. at 309. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Emily C. Byrd, When Does the Clock Stop? An Analysis of Point-in-Time and 
Continuing Offenses for Venue Purposes, 11 LOY. MAR. L.J. 175, 176, 179–83 (2012). 
 51 United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,”52 “indivisible, 
unlawful general practice that exists throughout the time span alleged,”53 and 
“an offense which continues day by day . . . not terminated by a single act or 
fact, but subsisting for a definite period and intended to cover or apply to 
successive similar obligations or occurrences.”54 
These descriptions all attempt to describe the idea that continuing 
offenses are fundamentally different from common crimes. Crimes such as 
fraud and forgery are characterized as single incident point-in-time offenses55 
that are complete “as soon as each element of the crime has occurred.”56 
Crimes such as kidnapping and conspiracy are characterized as continuing 
offenses by the courts.57 Courts describe fraud and forgery as “instantaneous 
events,”58 that are completed as soon as the false information or product is 
proffered;59 while kidnapping and conspiracy are “continuing process[es],”60 
where “each day’s acts bring a renewed threat of the substantive evil 
Congress sought to prevent.”61 Each day that a kidnapping victim remains 
kidnapped, the criminal offense is continuing;62 and each day that a 
conspiracy is being hatched, the criminal offense is continuing. Courts most 
often encounter disputes over the classification of a crime as point-in-time or 
continuing when defendants are charged with carrying a firearm during a 
crime of violence, conspiracy, or racketeering.63 
 
 52 State v. Williams, 319 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Neb. 1982) (quoting 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 1 at 6 (1961)). 
 53 Commonwealth v. Megna, 797 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
 54 Williams, 319 N.W.2d at 751 (quoting 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 1 at 6 (1961)). 
 55 United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 165–66 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 465 F.2d 5, 11 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Quirke, No. 1:12–MJ–261A, 2012 
WL 4369304, at *2 (D.R.I. Sept. 24, 2012). 
 56 McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078. 
 57 United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999); McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078; 
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 134–35 (1970) (White, J., dissenting); United States 
v. Garcia 854 F.2d 340, 343–44 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 58 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122 (distinguishing between offenses that occur as a “continuing 
process” and those that occur as “instantaneous events”). 
 59 Quirke, 2012 WL 4369304, at *2 (holding that “at the moment that an applicant makes 
a false statement with intent to procure a passport, the crime is complete” (citing Salinas, 373 
F.3d at 168–69)). The district court further noted that § 3237(a) should not be applied to 
passport fraud cases. Id. 
 60 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122; United States v. Garcia 854 F.2d 340, 343–44 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 61 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122. 
 62 See generally Garcia, 854 F.2d at 343. 
 63 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999); United States v. 
Praddy, 725 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
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Federal courts often use a two-prong test to determine if the continuing 
offense doctrine should be applied. The test states that “[a]n offense is a 
continuing offense if: (1) the explicit language of the relevant statute compels 
such a conclusion, or (2) the nature of the offense charged is such that 
‘Congress must assuredly have intended’ that the offense be treated as a 
continuing one.”64 
When looking at the explicit language of a statute, the Supreme Court 
has used a “verb test.”65 The verb test is a helpful “interpretative tool,” but it 
is not treated as a dispositive test.66 The test analyzes the verbs used in the 
statute to determine whether the crime occurs at once or whether the crime is 
ongoing.67 All federal crimes are defined in statutes, so the verb test often 
comes down to a few verbs, if not a single verb.68 
A. DEFINING ASSAULT: CONTINUING OR POINT-IN-TIME? 
In order to determine whether assault is a continuing or point-in-time 
offense, courts need only look at the essential conduct elements of assault.69 
The Department of Justice identified the definition of common law assault 
provided in Guarro v. United States as the default definition of assault absent 
a statutory definition.70 At common law, an assault is “an attempt with force 
or violence to do a corporal injury to another; and may consist of any act 
tending to such corporal injury, accompanied with such circumstances as 
denote at the time an intention, coupled with the present ability, of using 
actual violence against the person.”71 Follow-through can be irrelevant in the 
common law understanding of assault.72 A person can be guilty of assault 
without ever actually landing a blow.73 
 
 64 United States v. Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188 (D. Mass. 2010); see United States v. 
Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999); Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115. 
 65 Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 278. 
 66 Id. at 280. 
 67 Id. at 278. 
 68 Armistead M. Dobie, Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States District Court, 12 
VA. L. REV. 287, 289 (1926). 
 69 United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that an essential 
conduct element must be actioned in the charging district). 
 70 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL, ASSAULT – 18 U.S.C. § 351(e) (2018) 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1610-assault-18-usc-351e 
[https://perma.cc/E9RV-7UTK]. 
 71 Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (quoting Patterson v. 
Pillans, 43 App. D.C. 505, 506–07 (1915)). 
 72 Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177 (1958) (holding that a person can commit 
assault by “putting another in apprehension of harm whether or not the actor actually intends 
to inflict or is capable of inflicting that harm”). 
 73 Id. 
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The essential conduct elements of common law assault are (1) an 
attempt with force or violence to do a corporal injury to another (2) 
accompanied with the intent to use violence against the person and (3) the 
present ability to use actual violence against the person.74 The crime of 
assault is committed and completed when the attempt at injury is made. The 
last listed element of the common law definition of assault requires “present 
ability,” emphasizing the point-in-time nature of the offense.75 This element 
is the most significant as it is the clearest indication that assault was originally 
formulated as a point-in-time offense. The first element, an attempt, occurs 
immediately and is completed instantaneously. The element of intent latches 
on to the elements of attempt and present ability, which both focus on a 
specific moment. Therefore, assault is, and was historically intended to be, a 
point-in-time offense. Additionally, at least one U.S. District Court has stated 
that simple assault should be classified as a point-in-time offense.76 
The verb test results in a point-in-time classification for assault as well. 
In the common law definition of assault, the action verbs in the essential 
conduct elements are “attempt,” “use,” and “do,” which are all in the present 
tense. Exclusive use of present tense verbs in the conduct elements of the 
statute implies that these acts occur in a single moment.77 
Because the essential conduct elements of assault do not compel the 
courts to characterize assault as a continuing offense nor do they give rise to 
the notion that assault was intended to be viewed as a continuing offense, the 
next step in the analysis is to determine whether or not the use of 
transportation is an essential conduct element. 
In the common law definition of assault, no explicit or implicit reference 
to the use of transportation in the commission of an assault exists.78 Some 
state statutes embody the principles of the common law definition of assault, 
and some combine the elements of assault and battery into one offense.79 
Regardless of the differing need for physical contact in assault statutes, all 
 
 74 See generally Guarro, 237 F.2d at 580. 
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 76 United States v. Ashburn, No. 11-CR-3032014, 2014 WL 1800409, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. 
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 77 Guarro, 237 F.2d at 580. 
 78 See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 79 See Assault and Battery Overview, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-
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state statutes lack a reference to the use of transportation in the commission 
of an assault.80 Moreover, no legitimately conceivable list of assault elements 
would include the use of an airplane. 
B. THE INTERACTION OF 18 U.S.C. § 3237 AND DIFFERENT 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF CRIME 
The significance behind determining whether a criminal offense is a 
point-in-time or a continuing offense is that characterizing a crime as a 
continuing offense triggers 18 U.S.C. § 3237, which provides the 
government with the ability to prosecute the case “in any district in which 
such offense was begun, continued, or completed.”81 The interpretation and 
application of this statute is at the center of the cases composing the circuit 
split.82 The relevant part of the statute at issue in this Essay and the circuit 
split states: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against 
the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more 
than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such 
offense was begun, continued, or completed. 
Any offense involving the use of the mails, transportation in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or the importation of an object or person into the United States is a 
continuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of 
Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into 
which such commerce, mail matter, or imported object or person moves.83 
The second paragraph mentions the use of “transportation” which at 
first glance appears to provide an easy statutory answer to the issue of venue 
for in-flight assaults.84 As discussed in the previous Section, there is no 
mention of the use of transportation in any conceivable definition of assault.85 
Section 3237 is inapplicable to venue determinations for assault cases 
because the statute only applies to continuing crimes or crimes that include 
using transportation as a conduct element. 
 
 80 See State Assault and Battery Laws, FINDLAW, https://statelaws.findlaw.com/criminal-
laws/assault-and-battery.html [https://perma.cc/2GWG-NQ27] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 81 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). 
 82 United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1239–41 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 
1253–54 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 83 § 3237(a) (emphasis added). 
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III. CIRCUIT SPLIT CASES 
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit explicitly split from the Eleventh and Tenth 
Circuits on the issue of venue extension for crimes that occur during airplane 
flights.86 In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit held that it would be impossible for 
the government to deduce which district the plane was flying over when the 
assault was committed.87 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in 
judicial activism to expand 18 U.S.C. § 3237 into a “catch-all” provision that 
provides venue for any offense that occurs onboard a form of public 
transportation.88 The Tenth Circuit, in 2012, reaffirmed the holding of the 
Eleventh Circuit, but the offense committed in the Tenth Circuit’s case was 
a continuing offense that included the operation of an aircraft as one of its 
essential elements.89 While the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the incorrect 
interpretation of § 3237, the application of § 3237 was correct for the offense 
at issue in that case. The Ninth Circuit recently reheard its venue case, and 
the en banc panel joined the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.90 While the circuits 
may no longer be split, the different analysis proffered in each case warrant 
review. 
A. ANALYZING THE INITIAL MISAPPLICATION OF § 3237 IN UNITED 
STATES V. BREITWEISER 
In 2001, two teenage sisters, one fourteen years old and one eighteen 
years old, traveled by plane from Houston, Texas to Atlanta, Georgia.91 
During the flight, a man sitting in the same aisle as them, Russell Breitweiser, 
imposed himself on the girls by uninvitedly joining their conversations and 
asking them personal questions.92 His behavior grew stranger as he put one 
of the fourteen year old’s crayon in his mouth and nose.93 The criminal act in 
this case occurred when “Breitweiser put his hand on [fourteen-year-old] 
A.B.’s leg with his fingers spread out and rubbed it up and down her inner 
thigh.”94 The girls also suspected that at some point Breitweiser masturbated 
next to them underneath some pillows and a magazine.95 
 
 86 See, e.g., Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240–41 (declining “to adopt the reasoning or holding of 
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 89 United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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When Breitweiser left his seat to use the restroom, a concerned 
passenger asked the girls if they knew Breitweiser.96 The girls informed the 
passenger that they did not know him and that they were uncomfortable with 
him sitting next to them.97 The passenger informed the flight crew of the 
situation.98 When the plane was landing, the flight attendants brought the 
girls into the first-class cabin, and once everyone deplaned, the flight 
attendant escorted the girls to their connecting flight.99 
Ultimately Breitweiser was charged with and convicted of abusive 
sexual contact with a minor and simple assault of a minor.100 The abusive 
sexual contact charge resulted from Breitweiser rubbing the fourteen year 
old’s thigh.101 The simple assault charge was based on Breitweiser touching 
the fourteen-year-old girl’s legs, hands, face, and hair.102 The background 
provided in the opinion does not explain when Breitweiser touched the hands, 
face, and hair of the minor girl, so it is unclear whether it happened at the 
same time as the abusive sexual contact or at another time. 
The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia, which is the district the plane landed in.103 On appeal, 
Breitweiser raised improper venue as an issue, and the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals began its venue analysis by explaining the Sixth Amendment and 
Rule 18 guarantee “to be tried in the district in which the crime was 
committed,” but the court quickly turned away from that idea for a mangled 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3237.104 The court rightly stated that Congress 
intended § 3237 to apply to continuing crimes and crimes involving the use 
of transportation but then wrongly inflated that framework to include all 
crimes committed on a form of transportation.105 The court claimed that the 
government met its venue burden simply by showing that Breitweiser 
committed these offenses on a plane that landed in the Northern District of 
Georgia.106 This reasoning is incorrect. 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 1252. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1251. 
 104 Id. at 1251, 1253. 
 105 Id. at 1253 (citing United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 106 Id. 
2021] PROPER VENUE FOR CRIMES COMMITTED IN AIR 69 
As previously discussed, assault is not a continuing crime nor do the 
essential conduct elements of assault include the use of transportation.107 The 
Eleventh Circuit erred significantly when it misconstrued the circumstantial 
element of being on an airplane during flight to be an essential conduct 
element of using an airplane in the commission of an assault. Although 
Breitweiser acted unconscionably for the entire flight—the assault happened 
at a specific moment in time. The proper venue is the district over which the 
assault occurred: the flyover district.108 The one district the court knows this 
offense did not occur in is the Northern District of Georgia, as the minor girl 
was already well removed from Breitweiser when the plane entered into the 
navigable airspace above the Northern District of Georgia and when the plane 
landed on the ground.109 The court justified its decision to prosecute the case 
in a district where the crime irrefutably did not occur due to its belief that 
“[i]t would be difficult if not impossible for the government to prove, even 
by a preponderance of the evidence, exactly which federal district was 
beneath the plane when Breitweiser committed the crimes.”110 It is unclear if 
airplane GPS technology seventeen years ago was so primitive that this 
determination would truly be impossible; but, it is certainly not so today.111 
B. MISAPPLICATION RIGHTLY REAFFIRMED IN UNITED STATES V. 
COPE 
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning that 
venue can be established under 18 U.S.C. § 3237 simply by proving that a 
“crime took place on a form of transportation in interstate commerce.”112 
However, the facts in United States v. Cope are substantially different in a 
manner that affects venue analysis. While this case supported the legal theory 
promulgated by the Eleventh Circuit, the facts, crime charged, and basis for 
venue in Cope are significantly different to such a degree that it may stand 
on its own. 
Cope was charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 342, 
which states that it is a criminal offense to operate a common carrier under 
 
 107 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 108 See generally United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that 
a district includes the navigable airspace above it). 
 109 See Breitweiser, 357 F.3d at 1252. 
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the influence of alcohol.113 Cope was the copilot of a commercial flight from 
Texas to Colorado, and throughout the flight his copilot smelled alcohol 
inside the cockpit.114 The copilot first assumed the alcohol smell arose from 
a spilt drink outside the cockpit door, but when he leaned over Cope, he 
realized that Cope was the source of the alcohol smell.115 Cope’s copilot 
delayed the departure of their connecting flight and contacted the airline’s 
human resources department.116 The copilot escorted Cope to a “breath 
testing facility in the Denver airport” where he was breathalyzed twice: once 
scoring a .094 and then a .084 twenty minutes later.117 
The case was tried in the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado, which is the district where the flight landed.118 Venue was justified 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3237 because operating a common carrier under the 
influence of alcohol is a continuing crime.119 The crime occurs for as long as 
the offender is intoxicated and in control of the carrier. In this case the 
essential conduct elements were committed in multiple districts, including 
the district where the flight landed.120 This is proven by the results of the 
breathalyzer test showing alcohol still in Cope’s system after landing.121 
Additionally, the offense of operating a common carrier while under the 
influence of alcohol involves the use of transportation. The foundation of the 
crime is the operation of a mode of transportation; without it, there is only 
intoxication. While the Tenth Circuit was incorrect to uphold the reasoning 
from Breitweiser, the court was correct to use § 3237 when determining 
proper venue because Cope committed a continuing offense and an offense 
involving the use of transportation. 
C. RETURNING § 3237 TO ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE IN UNITED STATES V. 
LOZOYA 
In April 2019, the Ninth Circuit explicitly split from the Eleventh and 
Tenth Circuits on the issue of venue extension for crimes that occur during 
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airplane flights.122 In July 2015, Monique Lozoya traveled from Minneapolis, 
Minnesota to Los Angeles, California on a Delta Airlines flight.123 Lozoya 
claimed that she was unable to sleep during the flight because the passengers 
behind her hit her seat repeatedly and generally caused a commotion by 
“wrestling around with their stuff . . . hitting the chairs, the tray up and down, 
up and down.”124 Lozoya’s frustration led her to confront the couple in the 
row behind her later in the flight.125 
Testimonies conflict about the nature of the confrontation and the 
surrounding conversation but not about when it happened.126 Lozoya claimed 
that when the couple returned from the bathroom, she spoke to the male 
passenger from her seat while he was standing in the aisle and “politely asked 
him stop hitting her seat.”127 Lozoya alleged that the male passenger shouted 
“What?” aggressively and “quickly moved his hand to within a half-inch of 
her face.”128 Lozoya asserted that his reaction frightened her and led her to 
believe that he was going to hit her, so she pushed him away.129 
The couple testified to a different dynamic.130 The male passenger 
claimed that he was standing in the aisle with each hand resting on a seat-
head, when Lozoya “yelled at him to stop tapping his TV screen and then hit 
him with the back of her hand, causing his nose to bleed.”131 Regardless of 
who instigated the confrontation, Lozoya struck another passenger 
midflight.132 Two flight attendants responded, one to calm the parties 
involved and one to investigate what happened.133 Eventually, Lozoya was 
charged with and convicted of simple assault in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California.134 One of the issues Lozoya raised 
on appeal was improper venue in the Central District of California because 
the confrontation occurred long before the flight entered airspace over the 
Central District of California.135 
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At trial, the government argued that venue was proper in the Central 
District of California because Lozoya was on a flight that landed in Los 
Angeles.136 This reasoning was also used in Breitweiser and Cope.137 The 
Ninth Circuit intentionally rejected this argument.138 Instead, the Ninth 
Circuit gave proper weight and authority to the venue restrictions required 
by the Constitution.139 
Next, the Ninth Circuit utilized the standard two prong test to determine 
venue: (1) recognize the act(s) that make up the offense and (2) identify the 
location where those criminal acts were committed.140 For the first prong, the 
circuit court correctly recognized that “[t]he only essential conduct element 
here is the assault” and that the assault happened in an instant.141 For the 
second prong, even the government conceded that the assault occurred before 
Lozoya’s flight reached the airspace over the Central District of California.142 
The government continued on to argue that it is “impossible” to verify the 
location of the plane at the time of the incident.143 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this excuse.144 The Ninth Circuit rightly asserted that thorough investigation 
and flight data can lead the government to the exact location of the assault, 
at least to the degree of a preponderance of the evidence, which is the 
standard needed to establish venue. 145 
At trial, the district court held that venue in the Central District of 
California was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 and 18 U.S.C. § 3237.146 The 
Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed the applicability of § 3238, which governs 
crimes committed on the “high seas” or entirely outside the jurisdiction of 
the United States.147 The government tried to argue that the “high skies” are 
outside the jurisdiction of any district; therefore, venue is proper in the 
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district where the defendant is first apprehended on the ground.148 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this argument due to the binding circuit precedent holding 
that “the navigable airspace above [a] district is a part of the district.”149 
The Ninth Circuit discussed the inapplicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3237 at 
length.150 First, the circuit court correctly held that assault is not a continuing 
offense.151 The circuit court contrasted assault with drug trafficking to 
provide an example of a criminal offense where the essential conduct 
elements occur in multiple districts.152 The circuit court held that the airplane 
was a mere circumstance and that § 3237 does not authorize extending venue 
to wherever a plane travels after the commission of a criminal act.153 Venue 
can only be determined by essential conduct elements, and the circuit court 
correctly held that being on an airplane is not an essential conduct element 
of assault.154 Furthermore, the circuit court held that an assault does not affect 
interstate commerce.155 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit ruled “that the proper venue for Lozoya’s 
prosecution is the district in whose airspace the assault occurred.”156 
However, on December 20, 2019, it was “ordered that this case be reheard 
en banc pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) and Circuit 
Rule 35-3” in March 2020,157 but the COVID-19 pandemic delayed the 
proceeding until December 2020.158 The en banc panel overturned the prior 
decision of the Ninth Circuit, which essentially resolved the circuit split.159 
Nonetheless, a new analysis emerged. 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id; United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 150 Lozaya, 920 F.3d at 1239–41. 
 151 Id. at 1239. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 1239–40 ( “Section 3237(a) does not provide a basis for extending venue into the 
Central District simply because Flight 2321 continued into its airspace after the offense was 
complete. Once the assault had concluded, any subsequent activity was incidental and 
therefore irrelevant for venue purposes.”). 
 154 Id.; see supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
 155 Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240 (holding that “the conduct constituting the offense was the 
assault, which had nothing to do with interstate commerce”). 
 156 Id. at 1243. 
 157 United States v. Lozoya, No. 17-50336, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 38340, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Dec. 24, 2019). 
 158 United States v. Lozoya, 982 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 159 Id. at 650. 
74 MCCARTHY [Vol. 111 
D. REHEARING LOZOYA AND GETTING IT WRONG 
A split en banc panel amended the Ninth Circuit’s opinion to affirm the 
decision of the district court and join with the reasoning of the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits, but the en banc opinion provided a new twist on the venue 
analysis. At the beginning of its discussion, the en banc panel emphasized 
that Lozoya’s crime of simple assault was federalized under 49 U.S.C. 
§ 46506.160 Section 46501(2) established the “special aircraft jurisdiction of 
the United States” and § 46506 federalized numerous crimes, including 
assault, when committed on board an airplane during flight.161 The panel used 
§ 46506 to justify its application of § 3237.162 If Lozoya was not in an 
airplane when she slapped someone, then her crime would not fall under 
federal jurisdiction.163 The majority of the panel felt that this was enough to 
hold that Lozoya’s assault “involved” the use of an airplane.164 The panel did 
not address that this jurisdictional statute did not change the essential conduct 
elements of assault. Venue analysis is still required under federal jurisdiction. 
The panel also failed to engage in a meaningful analysis regarding the 
distinction between continuing offenses and point-in-time offenses. Instead, 
the panel dismissed that consideration as “of no import.”165 The panel did 
address the constitutional venue requirements, which resulted in the 
lackluster conclusion that “[t]he Constitution does not discuss the airspace 
over the several states.”166 While the Constitution does not address airspace 
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit did fifty years ago.167 
In United States v. Barnard, the Ninth Circuit held that “the navigable 
airspace above [a] district is a part of [that] district.”168 The en banc opinion 
attempts to disregard Barnard’s precedent in a footnote.169 The en banc 
opinion incorrectly claimed that the court in Barnard did not analyze Article 
III or the Sixth Amendment, so its holding should be ignored.170 This is 
plainly untrue. In Barnard, the Ninth Circuit stated, “Article III, Section 3, 
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of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment fix venue in the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”171 
The majority of the en banc panel blatantly ignored binding Ninth 
Circuit precedent, but then, in the same opinion, supported classifying 
airspace as part of a state’s jurisdiction and discussed how “states routinely 
assert jurisdiction over crimes committed in airspace.”172 Then, when 
discussing the inapplicability of § 3238, the majority stated that “crimes 
committed in airspace are within the jurisdiction of the states.”173 The en banc 
opinion flip-flopped and cherry picked when airspace should and should not 
be included in a jurisdiction. The majority also conflated federal jurisdiction 
with the freedom to choose from any federal district with no regard for venue 
analysis. 
The en banc panel did raise one valid concern with prosecuting Lozoya 
in the flyover district: the witnesses provided different estimates of the time 
of the assault.174 While all the witnesses agreed that Lozoya slapped another 
passenger when he returned from the bathroom, the witnesses provided 
different guesses as to what time it was when that happened.175 However, in 
the next Part, this Essay will explain how improved training and reporting 
procedures can alleviate this concern. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
While “common sense” may suggest that prosecuting crimes committed 
midflight in the district in which the plane lands is the obvious answer,176 it 
is both unconstitutional and unnecessary. Prosecuting midflight crimes in the 
district over which they occurred is supported by fundamental principles of 
the Constitution177 and is entirely possible with today’s technology.178 
Although the reporting procedures of air flight personnel leave much to be 
desired, simple standardized documentation and reporting procedures will 
make proper venue determinations easy.179 Lastly, given the significant 
increase of violence during air travel, prosecuting in-flight crimes in flyover 
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districts could become a deterrent for those who act as though they are flying 
through a lawless place.180 
A. AIRPLANE TECHNOLOGY PRECISION 
One of the main justifications the Eleventh Circuit provided for its 
holding was that it would be impossible to pinpoint the location of a plane 
when a crime occurred.181 The Global Positioning System (GPS) technology 
and electronic flight recording data that are used by airlines and air traffic 
control disprove the Eleventh Circuit’s claim. Airlines that utilize a ground-
based GPS can pinpoint a plane’s location “within 25 feet 95 percent of the 
time.”182 
GPS technology in aviation performs the same core purposes across the 
board.183 A receiver in the cockpit “pulls in signals from multiple satellites, 
determines how long the signals took to arrive, and uses that information to 
triangulate its own position.”184 At least three satellite signals are needed to 
determine a plane’s location over the ground, and if there is a fourth signal 
the receiver can measure altitude.185 Most GPS receivers used in the aviation 
industry measure “latitude, longitude, altitude, speed, and direction.”186 
In the United States, a new satellite-based system is being implemented 
that can pinpoint a plane’s location within 10 feet.187 The infrastructure for 
satellite-based radar for the United States was completed in 2014, which 
means that satellite-based radar exists everywhere that ground-based radar 
coverage exists, as well as in areas that previously lacked coverage, such as 
certain parts of the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska.188 
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This GPS technology is not exclusive to the government. There are 
many consumer websites that track flights in real time with precise detail.189 
Some websites even track airplanes on the ground at airports, and some track 
activity in remote places like Antarctica or Chernobyl, Ukraine.190 Most 
flight tracking websites utilize a technology called Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast, which receives “vital position and movement data 
from an aircraft’s transponder, such as altitude, speed, heading, and dozens 
of other attributes.”191 
Air traffic control officers monitor and record a plane’s movement 
during flight from the ground.192 Depending on the distance of a domestic 
commercial airline flight in the United States, the flight could travel through 
up to twenty-one airspace zones, which are further broken down into 
divisions, and each division is monitored by a controller.193 A flight progress 
strip records and updates seventeen data points as the plane moves from one 
division to the next.194 The flight progress strip records factors such as 
departure and destination points, altitude, ground speed, true air speed, past 
airspace zones, and the time the flight crossed through the previous airspace 
divisions.195 The flight progress strip is updated and transferred from 
controller to controller.196 Additionally, radar controllers provide instructions 
to pilots when they need to deviate from the scheduled flight plan, for reasons 
such as to reduce turbulence, avoid bad weather, or be placed in a holding 
pattern before landing.197 There are always many eyes in the skies. 
More information about the procedures of air traffic controller centers 
can be gathered through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests,198 but 
it is clear between available GPS technology and the publicly released 
procedures, that today’s technology can accurately pinpoint the location of a 
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plane at any given time. The Eleventh and Tenth Circuit’s claim that 
pinpointing the location of a plane over a judicial district is impossible is 
incorrect. A plane’s location can be determined within ten to twenty-five feet 
of accuracy in real-time and afterwards from flight data records. The main 
issue is the lack of proper documentation and recordation by flight personnel 
on board when an issue arises. 
B. ADDRESSING THE LACK OF REPORTING OF INFLIGHT 
INCIDENTS 
The most significant impediment to prosecuting crimes that occur 
during flight is a lack of established standards and procedures for 
documenting and reporting incidents as they occur, especially incidents of 
sexual assault. While many may assume that Air Marshals are always 
onboard and always step in when incidents arise, that is not the case.199 Air 
Marshals are present on less than half of U.S. flights and they often do not 
intervene unless the situation is life- or flight-threatening.200 
Flight attendants who do intervene when an incident occurs during 
flight have no rules or guidelines to adhere to and often have not had adequate 
training.201 Many flight attendants have reported that they do not know what 
to do if a passenger is harassed or assaulted during flight.202 When a flight 
attendant does intervene in a passenger conflict, the most common technique 
used is to simply physically separate the passengers.203 The pilot is 
responsible for notifying the air traffic controllers on the ground if law 
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enforcement intervention is necessary.204 In many cases, flight attendants 
diffuse the situation and do not report it.205 According to the Association of 
Flight Attendants-CWA, “[l]aw enforcement officials [were] contacted or 
met the plane less than half . . . the time” after an incident occurred during 
flight.206 While many airlines claim that “[t]he safety and security of 
passengers is the priority,” as of writing this Essay, no airlines report or 
publish their policies or provide any details on what mechanisms exist to 
protect passengers from being assaulted by other passengers.207 
However, change may be on the horizon. In October 2018, the passage 
of the FAA Reauthorization Act created a national task force to address in-
flight sexual misconduct, placed congressional focus on the issue of sexual 
misconduct on planes, and required the Department of Justice to establish 
reporting procedures for sexual misconduct.208 Under the direction of the 
U.S. Department of Transportation, the National In-flight Sexual Misconduct 
Task Force is responsible for reviewing “current practices, protocols and 
requirements of U.S. airlines in responding to and reporting allegations of 
sexual misconduct by passengers on board aircraft.”209 Based on public 
statements made by flight attendants and media investigations, the Task 
Force is not likely to find much.210 The Task Force is also responsible for 
providing recommendations on “training, reporting, and data collection” for 
in-flight passenger misconduct.211 In March 2020, the Task Force provided 
its first report to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Aviation Consumer 
 
 204 Louis Cheslaw, What Happens when a Law Is Broken on a Plane, CONDE NAST 
TRAVELER (July 8, 2019), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/what-happens-when-a-law-is-
broken-on-a-plane [https://perma.cc/9ZNZ-4MGH]; see Slotnick, supra note 203. 
 205 See Harriet Baskas, What One Flight Attendant Has to Say About Unruly Passengers, 
NBC (Oct. 4, 2016, 12:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/travel/what-one-flight-
attendant-has-say-about-unruly-passengers-n657476 [https://perma.cc/38A9-XGK4]. When 
asked about addressing unruly passengers during flight, one flight attendant stated, “[i]f 
there’s an issue on board most of the time it’s easier to let it go instead of waiting on authorities 
to meet the flight. We put up with so much nonsense it’s unbelievable.” Id. 
 206 ASS’N OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, supra note 203. 
 207 See Rene Marsh & Juana Summers, Women Detail Sexual Assaults and Harassment 
on Commercial Flights, CNN (Dec. 28, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/27
/politics/women-sexual-assaults-harassment-commercial-flights/index.html [https://perma.cc
/TF5J-VS6Y]. 
 208 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, P.L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186. 
 209 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., U.S. Department of Transportation Announces Aviation 
Consumer Protection Advisory Committee and National In-Flight Sexual Misconduct Task 
Force (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot7318 [https://perma
.cc/9MVP-P6K3]. 
 210 See supra Part IV.B. 
 211 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 209. 
80 MCCARTHY [Vol. 111 
Protection Advisory Committee (ACPAC),212 but it is unclear what weight 
this report carries or if ACPAC has taken any action to further circulate the 
report for review by the U.S. Transportation Secretary, Department of 
Justice, or major commercial airlines. With the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic, recommendations on how to improve reporting procedures for 
passenger misconduct take on an unforeseen, renewed importance. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COURTS, CONGRESS, AND FLIGHT 
PERSONNEL 
Courts should adhere to the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3237 and 
prosecute midflight crimes in the district over which they occur, unless and 
until Congress steps in and provides an appropriate statutory basis for finding 
venue outside the district over which the crime occurred. If prosecuting 
midflight crimes in flyover districts imposes substantial costs on the federal 
government, then Congress should step in and provide a clear statutory 
source for prosecuting crimes that occur in airspace outside the district in 
which they occurred. In the meantime, improved statutory regulations for 
flight attendants are needed for accurate venue determinations and for actual 
prosecutions to occur given the severe underreporting of midflight crimes.213 
Flight attendants should document and report all incidents that occur and 
allow law enforcement agencies to make final determinations on charges. 
1. A Return to the Text of § 3237 by the Courts 
The current circuit split over proper venue is a space where the 
legislature should step in and amend § 3237 or write a new statute entirely,214 
but ultimately the law, as it is right now, requires prosecuting midflight 
crimes in the district over which they occur.215 This procedure is required by 
the Constitution,216 although the Framers could not have imagined this 
scenario. 
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The judicial principle of prosecuting defendants in the place where they 
committed a criminal offense is one of the most meaningful principles of the 
American judicial system.217 The motivations for venue restriction grew out 
of unfair practices of the British Parliament and thus can be characterized as 
truly constitutional.218 Although the Framers intended to prevent defendants 
from being hauled off to foreign courts, the restrictions are clear and 
advancements in travel and communication technology remove the burden 
that previously was placed on individual defendants in order to appear in 
distant courtrooms.219 Venue restriction was further reinforced and codified 
for modern practice in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.220 
The case that spurred Congress’s enactment of § 3237(a) also reinforces 
the argument that § 3237 should not apply to crimes that do not include the 
use of transportation, mail, or interstate commerce as an essential conduct 
element. Congress enacted § 3237 in response to the outcome of United 
States v. Johnson.221 The Court in Johnson analyzed the proper venue for 
violations of the Federal Denture Act.222 The Federal Denture Act outlawed 
using “the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce” to transport 
dentures to a state that the dentist was not licensed in.223 The crime charged 
in Johnson included as one of its essential conduct elements the use of “the 
mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce.”224 At this point in time, 
before § 3237(a), Congress had to specify in each criminal statute that an 
offense could be prosecuted in multiple districts.225 If it did not do so, then 
normal venue rules applied. Congress had not provided any additional venue 
provisions in the Federal Denture Act, so the Court felt that the Constitution 
compelled a narrow venue analysis.226 The Court found that venue was 
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proper only in the district where the dentures were actually placed in the 
mail.227 In response to this holding, Congress enacted § 3237(a), which now 
allows for crimes that involve the use of mail, transportation, or interstate 
commerce to be “prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such 
commerce, mail matter, or imported object or person moves.”228 
More recently in Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, 
which was joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter, also provides 
support for the argument that § 3237 only applies to crimes that include the 
use of transportation, mail, or interstate commerce as one of its essential 
conduct elements.229 Quite different than the cases from the circuit split 
discussed in this Essay, Ashcroft addressed First Amendment concerns 
related to a provision of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).230 
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy engaged in a brief § 3237 venue analysis.231 
He justified the application of § 3237 to COPA prosecutions because COPA 
“includes an interstate commerce element, . . . and ‘[a]ny offense 
involving . . . interstate . . . commerce . . . may be inquired of and prosecuted 
in any district from, through, or into which such commerce . . . moves.’”232 
This venue analysis mirrors the analysis supported in this Essay. For § 3237 
to apply in an assault case, assault would need to include the use of 
transportation, mail, or interstate commerce as one of its elements. In 
Ashcroft, Justice Kennedy found that COPA “includes an interstate 
commerce element,”233 but neither the Ninth nor Eleventh Circuit found that 
assault includes the use of transportation, mail, or interstate commerce as one 
of its elements.234 
Expanding venue beyond constitutional restrictions without statutory 
justification is unconstitutional. A plain reading of § 3237 provides no 
support for extending venue to districts where a flight lands if that is not the 
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district where the crime occurred.235 The venue provisions are not ambiguous 
and do not require extensive interpretation.236 While some may argue that 
this results in an absurd practice, the result is what the Constitution and 
Federal Rules require.237 Furthermore, it is entirely possible with current 
aviation technology and improvements to reporting policies to pinpoint the 
exact districts over which inflight crimes occur.238 
2. Congress Should Amend § 3237 or Enact a New Airspace Venue Statute 
Prosecuting crimes in flyover districts requires courts to use more time 
and resources to make accurate and constitutional venue determinations. The 
tension between the practical considerations at issue and the honest answer 
that results from proper venue analysis of midflight crimes makes this an area 
that Congressmen across the aisle can agree needs correcting. Congress has 
two options: amend § 3237 to govern all offenses that occur on a common 
carrier or enact a new statute that governs offenses committed on a common 
carrier and specify that the destination district is an appropriate venue. A 
detailed statutory analysis of the language that should be employed is beyond 
the scope of this Essay, but it is worthwhile to emphasize that Congressional 
intervention is warranted and encouraged. 
3. Flight Personnel Need More Regulatory Guidance from the FAA 
Regardless of what the courts or Congress do on paper, flight personnel 
need more support in the real world. Under 49 U.S.C. § 44734 flight 
attendants are only required to receive training in four areas: “(1) serving 
alcohol to passengers; (2) recognizing intoxicated passengers; (3) dealing 
with disruptive passengers; and (4) recognizing and responding to potential 
human trafficking victims.”239 With the specific exception of human 
trafficking, none of the training requirements involve documentation or 
reporting of inter-passenger conflict.240 In practice, flight attendants often 
diffuse situations and separate the involved passengers without taking formal 
action.241 
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Prosecution of midflight crimes requires standardized form recording 
and reporting procedures.242 The International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) recommends that training on disruptive passengers include 
“categorizing of incidents” and “reporting of incidents,” as well as “periodic 
re-training.”243 Standard forms should include blocks for date, time 
(multiple), flight number, flight leg, responding flight crew members, 
passenger names, passenger seat numbers, incident narrative description, 
injuries incurred, first aid administered, passenger witnesses, pilot notified, 
flight rerouted for landing, delivered to authorities, and the identification and 
contact information of law enforcement agency taking over.244 All of the 
necessary information can be consolidated into a one-page form, but the 
IATA provides examples of extensive documentation that can be used, as 
well as sample warning cards that can be distributed to disruptive 
passengers.245 
The FAA should amend its regulations governing flight attendant 
training and responsibilities to require trainings that provide clear and 
concise standardized procedures for documenting and reporting assaults, as 
well as other simple crimes, that occur during flight. A minimum of two flight 
attendants should respond to every disruption during a flight. One attendant 
will be responsible for documentation, and the other attendant(s) will be 
responsible for intervening, diffusing, and ensuring the safety of the flight 
and its passengers. All disruptions should be documented even if the incident 
does not warrant law enforcement involvement. Increased documentation of 
disruptions may lead to increased prosecution of crimes that do occur 
midflight. Passengers should be made aware of the consequences for 
disruptive behavior at the beginning of the flight during taxi with all other 
safety procedures. This information should also be provided in a leaflet in the 
seatback pocket with other safety and flight information.246 These 
recommendations represent a baseline for the procedures necessary to 
provide accurate information to prosecutors in order to establish venue 
beyond a preponderance of the evidence. 
D. USING FLYOVER DISTRICTS AS A DETERRENT 
A criminological argument for restricting venue to flyover districts is 
that doing so may deter crime. One flight can cover many districts and being 
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hauled states away for a crime you committed midflight can be quite the 
burden, but that burden can act as a deterrent to crime on planes. As 
previously suggested, passengers should be made aware at the beginning of 
a flight that criminal behavior will result in prosecutions located in the district 
over which the offense was committed.247 
There are three main components to deterrence–severity, certainty, and 
celerity of punishment–and restricting proper venue to overflight districts can 
accomplish each.248 Deterrence occurs when an individual weighs the costs 
and benefits of committing a crime and chooses not to commit a crime.249 
Passengers must be informed at the start of a flight that disruptive behavior 
will not be tolerated during flight and that criminal actions will be prosecuted 
in flyover districts. In order for any of the three main factors of deterrence to 
be effective, the existence of such venue requirements must be explained to 
the passengers. 250 
Severity, certainty, and celerity of punishment do not work alone, and 
the strength of one affects the other.251 In this case, prosecuting midflight 
crimes in flyover districts can create a severe consequence depending on the 
distance covered by the flight. Although possibly quite severe, if a would-be 
perpetrator knows with utmost certainty that such prosecution is unlikely to 
happen, the severe consequence has less of an effect.252 Furthermore, if the 
potential perpetrator knows that he will not be tracked down until the 
unforeseeable future, severe or certain consequences are less likely to have a 
deterrent effect.253 
Having standardized procedures for reporting midflight crimes will 
increase the severity, certainty, and celerity factors of deterrence. Requiring 
that these crimes be prosecuted in flyover districts might be a severe enough 
consequence to deter some potential perpetrators from engaging in criminal 
behavior during flight. Requiring flight attendants to announce flyover venue 
provisions before take-off and equipping flight attendants with standardized 
forms and protocols increases the certainty that would-be perpetrators will 
be prosecuted. Lastly, having standard protocols in place for flight attendants 
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to follow will increase celerity because flight attendants will not have to 
decide whether to intervene and what to do because they will be required to 
intervene in all conflicts and have standard procedures to follow when doing 
so. 
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Flyover districts are the proper venue for point-in-time offenses that 
occur on airplanes during flight according to the text of the Constitution and 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.254 However, some argue that the district 
where the plane lands constitutes proper venue because holding otherwise 
would be absurd.255 Others may argue that an application of the substantial 
contacts theory in criminal procedure presents a more palatable middle 
ground.256 
A. “COMMON SENSE” 
The Eleventh Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and, now, the Ninth Circuit claim 
that the district in which a flight lands after a crime was committed is the 
obvious choice for proper venue.257 Their argument relies on the 
interpretation that subsection (a) in § 3237 provides a statutory foundation 
for venue being proper in the district in which the flight lands.258 Subsection 
(a) provides venue for offenses that involve “the use of the mails, 
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, or the importation of an 
object or person into the United States.”259 Their interpretation holds that if 
a person is simply on a form of transportation when a crime occurs, then the 
offense transforms into a continuing crime and can be prosecuted wherever 
the offender’s trip may end.260 The main issue with this interpretation is that 
it ignores the statute’s intended purpose of classifying offenses and instead 
conflates the statute’s application to offenders who may be using a form of 
transportation when they commit a crime regardless of whether that use of 
transportation is necessary to commit the crime. 
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The dissent in the Ninth Circuit’s original Lozoya decision conceded 
that the statute does not clearly support this holding but held that the 
jurisprudence on statutory interpretation requires the court to refrain from 
interpretations that lead to absurd results.261 The dissent provided an example 
of claimed absurdity in asking a child to pinpoint when an assault occurred 
in order to determine venue instead of defaulting to the district where the 
plane eventually lands.262 While a child may not immediately be able to 
provide detailed testimony, this Essay suggests placing the onus on flight 
attendants to promptly and thoroughly record incidents when they happen.263 
Furthermore, investigating when a crime occurred is not an absurd 
requirement of law enforcement. 
Determining where in the sky a crime occurred is not impossible 
either.264 GPS technology and air traffic control procedures track the location 
of planes within a few feet.265 Hobbyists on consumer websites can track the 
movements of airplanes with precise detail, so there is no practical reason for 
courts to hold that it is too difficult for law enforcement to determine where 
a plane was in flight at a given time.266 While air travel may make venue 
determinations more difficult, a challenging circumstance is not enough to 
overpower the requirements of the Constitution.267 
B. REVIVAL OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CONTACTS THEORY 
Because the district where the flight lands and the district over which 
the crime occurred might both be arbitrary locations to the parties involved, 
others may suggest the substantial contacts theory is appropriate and apply it 
in cases such as these. Although the substantial contacts test has not been 
universally or uniformly accepted by courts, the Supreme Court hinted at its 
approval for the test in Rodriguez-Moreno.268 After the Court refused to reject 
the substantial contacts test in Rodriguez-Moreno, the Second Circuit and 
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other individual district courts have utilized the substantial contacts test in 
determining venue for continuing offenses.269 
In 2000, immediately preceding Rodriguez-Moreno, the Second Circuit 
laid out the four factors of the substantial contacts test: “(1) the site of the 
crime, (2) its elements and nature, (3) the place where the effect of the 
criminal conduct occurs, and (4) suitability of the venue chosen for accurate 
factfinding.”270 The Second Circuit is the only court that regularly employs 
the substantial contacts test, dating back to the 1980s.271 
The substantial contacts test has been employed in cases involving 
continuing offenses, such as racketeering, kidnapping, and conspiracy.272 
The substantial contacts test is inappropriate for blanket application to 
midflight crimes. Many crimes committed midflight, such as assault, are 
point-in-time offenses and thus do not warrant the extended analysis of the 
substantial contacts test. The fourth factor, “suitability of the venue chosen 
for accurate factfinding,”273 is the only relevant factor for midflight offenses 
as many courts have cited the difficulty or absurdity in determining venue for 
crimes that occur midflight. 
For example, if two individuals involved in an assault are flying from 
Maine to California, there are many districts over which this flight passes, 
and prosecution in any one of them may seem arbitrary and unfair. If this 
flight includes a layover, or a forced early landing, in Columbus, Ohio or 
Houston, Texas, prosecution in either of those districts where the flight lands 
is just as arbitrary as any flyover district to two individuals flying to a 
vacation in California from their homes in Maine.274 If both individuals are 
residents of Maine, and a few witnesses onboard also happen to be residents 
of Maine, then the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine might be the 
most suitable venue for factfinding as the offender, victim, and witnesses all 
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 270  United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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 273 Saavedra, 223 F.3d at 93. 
274 This hypothetical scenario is similar to a real midflight disruption discussed in the 
Introduction, where an intoxicated man began assaulting passengers on a flight from Texas 
to California, and the plane was forced into an early landing in Arizona due to the incident.  
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reside there. This would result in a venue not previously chosen by any 
court—venue in the district from where the flight departed. 
The issue with the substantial contacts test is that it is unlikely that all 
of the parties, witnesses, and evidence involved will belong to a single 
judicial district, and thus any determination from the substantial contacts test 
might appear favorable to one side. Given the complexity of air travel, almost 
any district where a midflight crime is prosecuted will seem arbitrary to one 
of the parties involved, but only the flyover district has the backing of the 
Constitution.275 
CONCLUSION 
At first glance, flyover districts may seem like a surprising choice for 
venue, but flyover districts are the only constitutionally proper venue for 
point-in-time offenses that occur on airplanes during flight.276 Section 3237 
as it is currently written does not dictate venue for all crimes that occur on 
public transportation, only those that involve the use of transportation in the 
essential conduct elements.277 Courts have expanded § 3237 far past what it 
was originally intended to govern in order to avoid dealing with the 
difficulties that air travel raises in criminal proceedings.278 
While some may claim that venue in destination districts is the simple 
and obvious answer to a costly and complex problem, that is not the case. 279 
Pinpointing where a point-in-time offense occurred is entirely possible with 
current aviation tracking protocol and GPS technology.280 Implementing 
standardized documenting and reporting of inflight disruptions will make 
prosecutions more likely and venue determinations easier.281 
Courts should refrain from following the reasoning created by the 
Eleventh Circuit as it has no constitutional or statutory basis. If midflight 
offenses are to be prosecuted in destination districts, then that is a decision 
to be made—and one that should be made—by legislators, not judges.282 
Unless Congress steps in and enacts a new statute or an amendment to 
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§ 3237, the only proper venue for point-in-time offenses that occur on an 
airplane during flight is the flyover district.283 
 
 283 See id. at 1243. 
